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 Howard Leventhal, Institute for Health, Healthcare Policy, and Aging Research, Rutgers 
University, New Brunswick, 08901, NJ, USA. E-mail: hleventhal@ifh.rutgers.edu 
It is our pleasure to up-date this journal’s readers on recent developments of the 
Common-Sense Model (CSM) and its contribution to our understanding of how people 
manage chronic conditions in everyday life. The CSM explicates the perceptual, 
behavioral, and cognitive processes involved in the creation of individuals' 
representations of the somatic and functional properties of the Self, the properties of 
illnesses, and the treatment required to manage illnesses, including formation of action 
plans for carrying out the treatment. We first outline the CSM's underlying properties, 
followed by a brief overview of its history, with selected examples of studies that drove 
it forward. The concluding section addresses directions for future research. 
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Underlying Properties and Assumptions of the CSM 
 
The CSM Consists of Five Core Constructs  
 
Five sets of variables comprise illness representations that are perceptions 
activated in response to somatic and functional changes. These perceptual domains 
include: 1) identity (pattern, location and severity of somatic sensations/symptoms 
and their possible meaning or label), 2) timeline (rate of illness onset; perception of 
illness duration and rates of decline), 3) consequences (functional, social, and 
financial) due to the illness and/or treatment, 4) cause (e.g., exertion; ate tainted 
food), and 5) control (e.g., home remedy stopped pain; nothing worked and went to 
the doctor). A similar set defines the representations of possible treatments and/or 
self-management steps ("treatment representations"): 1) identity (label, associated 
effects, experience when used), 2) timeline (duration of treatment; expectations for 
time required until treatment benefits are observed), 3) consequences (e.g., pain 
post-surgery, side effects), 4) control (e.g., surgery removed tumor; antacid stopped 
pain; how far treatment goes towards complete symptom/condition management), 
and 5) cause (underlying mechanism/link to illness; e.g., antibiotic applied to 
wound kills germs).  
 
CSM Constructs are Concrete and Abstract 
 
It is important to note that the variables in each of the five sets (identity to 
perceived cause) are both physically experienced (pain is felt; cuts and bruises are 
felt and seen) and mentally conceptualized (e.g., the belief that pain indicates 
biological disease/disorder and that biological disease/disorder causes pain). Thus, 
both concrete experience and abstract reasoning create illness and treatment 
representations ‒ for example, the seen and painful, bleeding red area is understood 
as a cut or abrasion from a fall; the lump is conceived of as a cancer; the chest pain 
a heart attack. The problem, of course, is that the conceptualization may be 
incorrect ‒ that is, the lump may not be a cancer ‒ and the criterion used for 
evaluation of control (e.g., removal of pain) may not be a valid indicator of control 
of the underlying condition. In other words, the experiential features and concepts 
may or may not be in agreement with biological reality. Concrete and abstract 
levels are also involved in the multi-level representations of the Self and 
representations active at a given moment, e.g., self, illness or injury, and the 
representations of possible treatments, create expectations and the choice of a 
specific action for management.  
 
Representation Formation is "Bayesian" 
 
Bayesian probability modeling involves updating the likelihood (probability 
estimate) of occurrence or presence of an event given new, relevant information. 
Leventhal, H., Phillips, L.A., Burns, E.: 
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The analogous process in CSM is the updating of the representation of a somatic or 
functional change, its perceived identity and how it is labelled, and the expectations 
regarding its consequences, control, time frame or duration, and possible causes 
and perception as a threat and fear provoking. The representations are shaped by 
prior history, the prototypes acquired from past experience with own illnesses and 
injuries, observations of illness in others, and exposure to media and cultural beliefs 
about illness. Thus, an individual's interpretation of a new symptom can reflect 
his/her prior experience with that symptom (Teel, Meek, McNamara, & Watson, 
1997), observations of the experiences of others, particularly family members, and 
information from media or other sources of health information (abstract levels of 
information rather than from concrete experiences).  
 
Representations are "Multi-Level" 
 
A representation can be initiated by a verbal cue, e.g., a medical diagnosis of 
cardiac disease or cancer, or a concrete cue, such as a lump or pain. Thus the 
process generating the representation and its content is multi-level; perceived and 
felt, and abstract or conceptual. The content defining the representation is a product 
of the individual's prior somatic experience, environmental exposures or behavioral 
antecedents, observations of others in similar situations and exposures to media as 
well as a variety of cultural inputs. The representation will also activate plans for 
action and anticipations for specific outcomes. The linkage of an active 
representation to the past and anticipated future, can proceed consciously and/or 
automatically (largely non-conscious); for example, when the somatic system 
notices a change in functioning below conscious awareness, the individual may be 
triggered to think of previously experienced illnesses without having to consciously 
work out the linkages between the current symptom, past illnesses, and likely future 
progression of illness.   
 
Representations Come From Prototypes of Self, Illness, and Treatment/Action  
 
Representations are activated when cues from one's own physical system or 
observations of others, interact with prototypes. CSM represents somatic or 
functional cues from one's own physical system as deviations from the prototypes 
of the Self, a prototype that is a product of an individual's prior experience and 
biological structure. Similarly, prototypes of specific illnesses, treatments and self-
management strategies or action plans, are repositories of personal experience with 
specific illnesses (symptoms and diagnosed or labelled), observations of illnesses 
and management by others, and media-based messages. As repositories of history, 
prototypes are the source of the base rates and expectations in the five content areas 
of illness and treatment representation. For example, if a previously symptom-free 
individual experiences an abrupt onset of severe chest pain, the quality, location, 
duration and disruption of ongoing activity in conjunction with perceived, 
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antecedent causes generates active mental representations of a current condition ‒ 
for example, "I'm having a heart attack", food poisoning, etc. The activation 
process is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Matching Deviations from Self to Illness Prototypes  
 
 
 
Note. Prototypes are averages of a history of experiences with SELF and specific illnesses. Prototype 
for FLU and prototype for HEART FAILURE can share expected pattern and location of some 
symptoms (obstructed breathing; fatigue), though they differ markedly in Time Lines, control and 
outcomes. The process is computational as each prototype assigns different weights to each deviation. 
Repetition forms modules (stomach problem; migraine; etc.) that generate higher order, declarative 
structure, e.g., ACUTE and CHRONIC models. As the number of conditions increase with age and 
properties fit two or more prototypes there is increasing uncertainty in the construction of 
representations. Representations based on histories of repeated construction are activated rapidly and 
can interfere with the construction of new, biologically valid representations, a problem with many 
chronic, asymptomatic conditions onset in the later years of life. 
 
 
Theoretical and Empirical Development of the Common Sense Model (CSM) 
 
Early Antecedents: Perception of Health Threat and Action Plans  
 
The CSM was developed iteratively and has had several different names in its 
history. Early evidence highlighted the importance of personal and loved-ones' 
experiences and action plans for predicting engagement in a target behavior. A 
study examining community responses to the 1957 flu pandemic was the first in a 
series from which CSM evolved (Rosenstock, Hochbaum, & Leventhal, 1960). The 
data showed that participants who experienced symptoms or saw family members 
or a close friend fall ill, were more likely to believe they were at risk, that flu was 
severe, and to take action (e.g., to call the doctor; speak to a pharmacist; get a flu 
shot). Thus, concrete experience led to abstract ideas or health beliefs regarding flu 
vaccination and an array of actions (Leventhal, Hochbaum, & Rosenstock, 1960).  
Leventhal, H., Phillips, L.A., Burns, E.: 
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A series of studies examining the effects of fear-arousing communications on 
preventive health behaviors identified a central component of the model: "action 
plans" (see Leventhal, 1970). The importance of detailed planning for action was 
clear from the data showing that both a highly threatening, as well as a mild, or low 
threatening fear message about the dangers of contracting tetanus, were equally 
likely to lead to action if the fear messages were followed by a concrete, action plan 
‒ a map showing the location of a health clinic and examples as to when one would 
pass the tetanus-shot clinic during daily class changes (Leventhal, Singer, & Jones, 
1965). Although the highly fearful message generated a significant level of 
intention to act, neither it nor the milder message were antecedents to action in the 
absence of an action plan. Action plans alone, however, were insufficient for 
action; both threat message and an action plan were essential antecedents to action.  
The above studies, and others, set the stage for the Self-Regulation-Model (the 
earlier version of CSM) in two important ways. First, the studies emphasized the 
importance of experience, perception and concrete behavioral plans, for health 
relevant action. Second, they made it clear that three sets of factors were important 
for action: a sense of an existent threat, the availability of a method of control or 
coping, and a plan for action. Fear seemed to function by enhancing attitudes 
favorable to the health message and generating intentions to act, but fear and its 
associated beliefs and intentions, faded over time. The representation of the threat, 
the behavior for control, and the plan stayed in mind. Missing from the Self-
Regulation Model, however, was the content and structure of the threat; i.e., how 
were the threat of tetanus, of smoking, of the flu epidemic, represented? We did not 
know. 
 
Content and Structure of Illness Representations  
 
Studies of seeking care for acute conditions and longer term management of 
chronic illnesses identified the five sets of variables that make the representations 
of an illness and its treatments, and examined how these representations are 
activated and when and how they generate action plans and action.  
 
Responding to short term health threats: An acute model. There is an 
abundance of evidence for the following, simple hypothesis: deviations from the 
normal self, that is symptoms and other physical and cognitive dysfunctions, 
motivate care seeking (Stoller, Pollow, & Forster, 1994). Whether a deviation leads 
to care seeking depends, however, on the content of the five domains of an illness 
representation: the associated symptoms of the health threat, its severity, and 
possible applied labels (identity), its rate of onset and duration (timeline), its 
response to self-management (control), its consequences (e.g., disruption of daily 
activities), and its perceived determinants (causes). Individuals' perceptions of each 
of these variables motivate seeking care. These effects were documented in detail 
in a year-long study comparing 111 individuals who sought medical care to 111 
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control participants, who were selected from a larger sample to match the care 
seekers in gender, age and family size but who did not seek care in the study time 
period (Cameron, Leventhal, & Leventhal, 1995). Symptoms were clearly an 
antecedent to care seeking, because all 111 care seekers reported symptoms, 
whereas only 33 of the matched controls reported symptoms. Further comparisons 
of the 111 care seekers to the 33 symptomatic, non-care seeking controls showed 
differences in their perceived timelines (care seekers' symptoms had been present 
for approximately 10 days, controls' for less than 6 days) and identity (68% of care 
seekers labeled their symptoms vs 46% of symptomatic control participants). The 
33 control patients also regarded their symptoms as less disruptive (1.39 vs 3.27 out 
of 5), and they were far less likely to be advised to seek care after communicating 
to someone (9% vs 50% for the care seekers). There is little reason to doubt that 
symptom onset is critical for care seeking when onset is amplified as illustrated by 
the Cameron et al. (1995) data. Care seeking is provoked when the experience of an 
illness appears to exceed the parameters of a general acute model (symptoms 
vanish in a brief time, are unimportant and not disruptive of daily life). This 
general, acute model, appears to underlie the care seeking of many of the patients in 
Cameron et al. study (1995). 
 
Responding to long term health threats: A chronic model. Chronic, mostly 
life-long conditions, are often asymptomatic, their duration and silent development 
creating a far different framework for management than that specified by the acute 
model, which fits with individuals' prior, prototypical experiences of common acute 
illnesses, such as the common cold or the flu. An abundance of data across multiple 
conditions verifies the consequences of inconsistencies between an acute 
framework (the expectation that all illnesses are symptomatic and short lived) and a 
chronic reality (the asymptomatic progression and life-long timeline of many 
chronic health threats). Hypertension, asthma, congestive heart failure and diabetes 
are prime examples of this inconsistency and are also four of the five most 
prevalent conditions (depression the 5th) that drive health care spending in the 
United States (Halverson, 2007; WHO, 2009). Non-adherence to treatment is the 
primary outcome of the inconsistency between the acute and chronic models for 
self-management. A rapid tour of the supporting data makes vivid the truth of a 
statement attributed to C. Everett Koop, former Surgeon General of the United 
States: "Drugs don't work in patients who don't take them!"…and patients won't 
take drugs unless they perceive a need to do so, even when asymptomatic 
(DiMatteo, Giordani, Lepper, & Croghan, 2002; Haynes, Ackloo, Sahota, 
McDonald, & Yao, 2008).  
 
Hypertension. Our early study of patients with hypertension examined the 
content and operation of an acute, symptomatic model of hypertension and its 
ramifications for health behavior, in 165 patients (Meyer, Leventhal, & Gutmann, 
1985). Virtually all (80%) agreed with the statement that, "People can't tell whether 
Leventhal, H., Phillips, L.A., Burns, E.: 
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their blood pressure is up". They also believed however, that they could "tell when 
my own blood pressure is up" (92%). These patients reported a commonsense array 
of blood pressure symptoms (e.g., headache; dizziness; warm face; etc.) and 
reported that their blood pressure was in control if they perceived that the treatment 
impacted their symptoms (which is medically inaccurate)! Belief in an acute model 
(that one had hypertension only when experiencing symptoms, typical of acute 
conditions) was associated with discontinuation of treatment. 
 
Asthma. The acute model is also at work for patients with asthma. Of 198 
patients with asthma, 92% believed that they would always have asthma (definitely, 
probably, or possibly), but at the same time, 53% believed that they had it only 
when symptomatic ‒ that is, they believed that they did not have asthma when they 
were not experiencing symptoms (Halm, Mora, & Leventhal, 2006). In short, a 
majority thought they had asthma for a lifetime but not all of the time. Patients 
holding to an acute model, i.e. have asthma only when symptomatic, are less likely 
to use a peak flow meter or make and keep routine visits for asthma when 
asymptomatic (see also Kaptein et al., 2008). 
 
Heart failure and myocardial infarction (MI). The widely held common-sense 
prototypical symptoms for heart attacks, or myocardial infarction (MI), include 
chest and/or shoulder pain, profuse sweating, and shortness of breath. The 
symptoms are recognized as cardiac-related by both laypersons and practitioners. 
While these "classic" symptoms are the most common, at least for men, a 
significant number of individuals with MI will present with "atypical" symptoms, 
and this is more likely with increasing age (Canto et al., 2000). If symptoms are 
atypical, particularly if located in a part of the body not associated with heart 
function, then forming identity beliefs of symptoms indicating an MI is less likely 
(e.g., if pain is perceived to be in the upper abdomen rather than chest, it can be 
interpreted as gastric distress, a "stomach" or gut problem and not a heart problem). 
Bunde and Martin (2006) have shown that such common-sense views of symptoms 
affect the behavior of individuals experiencing an MI; delay in getting to a hospital 
is less common if they have a prior cardiac history, and report having experienced 
classic symptoms of chest pain, profuse sweating and shoulder pain. They are likely 
to delay care-seeking if they perceived that pain had a gastric cause, and if they 
experienced fatigue and sleep disturbances. Common-sense misidentification of 
symptoms also occurs for patients with heart failure. Breathlessness, chronic 
fatigue and swollen feet are signs of heart failure for a physician, but more likely 
interpreted as signs of aging to an elderly layperson; after all, one's heart is not in 
one's feet. Patients articulate these misperceptions: "When you hear about having 
heart problems ... you're supposed to feel maybe a pain in your left arm, maybe a 
pain in your chest, or pressure … It would have been clearer to me if I had chest 
pain and then I would have said, okay, I'll call and say I'm having chest pain ..." 
(Horowitz, Rein, & Leventhal, 2004). Patients fail to act when the somatic pattern 
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fails to map onto the prototype pattern of symptoms for heart disease. If it's nothing 
more than the usual acute event, e.g., a stomach ache, fatigue or "I didn't feel that 
great", even a dramatic event will fail to elicit care seeking. As one patient with 
heart failure said; "I guess that I could have gone to the doctor after I had that 
collapse on the hallway floor. It might have been a good idea." 
 
Content and Structure of Treatment Representations 
 
Although deviations from the normative self (symptoms; physical or cognitive 
dysfunction) establish a target for action, the treatment prototype elicited by the 
target is critical for response selection; for example, a severe or long lasting 
symptom leads to a doctor visit and sudden chest pain leads to rapid care seeking 
because of the perceived severity of the threats that have those characteristics. 
Conversely, fatigue and swollen legs in an elder may be tolerated and lived with as 
prototypical signs of aging. Less dramatic and more frequent everyday experiences 
are consistent with the pattern for acute, self-manageable conditions; it is common-
sense to take an aspirin or acetaminophen for a stress headache and to rest if one is 
tired. Response selection and the action plan for implementation are consistent with 
expectations based upon the prototype underlying the experienced dysfunction and 
with the prototype of the action selected to ameliorate the deviation. Awareness of 
the prototype for action can be overlooked, as many actions are highly automatic 
(see, e.g., priming literature; Henderson, Hagger, & Orbell, 2007). Treatment 
prototypes can, however, become highly conscious and engage extensive 
deliberation when motivated by a deviation interpreted as highly threatening and 
fear arousing, such as calling for medical care if target symptoms indicate a heart 
attack, or cancers that pose serious threats to function and life. As is the case with 
illness prototypes, prototypes and the active representations of a treatment may 
address only part or completely misrepresent the underlying bio-physical properties 
of the threat (e.g., avoiding stressful situations to manage hypertension as stress 
reduction minimizes stress symptoms). Assessing treatment prototypes and how 
they are created and automated, are critical topics for research. Additional questions 
concerning how practitioners, family members and peers influence the creation of 
prototypes and encourage consistent use of specific procedures for managing illness 
threats, are open for intensive study. As the CSM is a complex system describing 
responses to management for many conditions, one must begin to address how it 
affects action at a given moment and how it impacts illness outcomes given the 
possibilities that it can be consistent and/or inconsistent with the biological 
processes involved in a condition at that point in time.  
Given that people hold a vast array of common sense ideas regarding the role 
of medical treatments (foods, physical activity, relaxation, and social stresses) as 
possible causes and means of controlling illnesses, relatively few have been studied 
in detail; medication beliefs is an exception. Horne and colleagues (Horne et al., 
2013) developed scales to assess patients' beliefs that medications are necessary for 
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one's health (specific to a chronic condition and prescribed medication) and their 
concerns that the medications may be harmful. A meta-analysis of 94 of the 223 
publications that met criteria (adults; valid scale to assess adherence; etc.) showed 
that the Specific Necessity Beliefs scores were positively and consistently related to 
adherence, and Specific Concerns scores were consistently and negatively related 
to adherence. There is also a General Beliefs about Medicines subscale that 
assesses general beliefs about the necessity of medication versus alternative 
treatments for conditions (Horne, Weinman, & Hankins, 1999). The moderate and 
consistent relationship of these items to reported adherence is evidence for the 
importance of treatment prototypes, and the need to address both treatment and 
illness prototypes in clinical settings, and when designing communications to 
increase adherence for testing in randomized clinical trials.  
 
Action Panning for Effective Self-Management 
 
The concepts and data supporting the CSM address a key question raised by 
the studies on fear communications; "What are the cognitive factors or 
representations that combine with plans to generate action?" The question arose 
because fear messages increased intentions to take preventive actions but did not 
actually lead to action. We now know that the representations of the health threat 
and the treatment, not the fear per se, were the factors that combined with action 
plans to generate action (Leventhal, 1970; Tannenbaum et al., 2015a). Although the 
common-sense processes are necessary for action, it was clear that an action plan, 
in addition to the representations of illness and treatment, was essential for 
actuating behavior. Our better understanding of illness and treatment 
representations does not answer an important second question; "How do people 
generate action plans on their own?"  
Precisely what is meant by "generating action plans on one's own?" In the 
early studies of fear communication, action planning was stimulated by the 
experimenters. The undergraduate subjects were given a map of their campus with 
the student health center circled. They were then provided with examples of class 
changes that went past the health center and encouraged to review their own 
schedules to identify the same patterns; this latter request (to review their 
schedules) was the main component requiring active involvement (Leventhal et al., 
1965). The question is whether people engage in planning on their own, and if so, 
what initiates it and how do they do it? Do they scan their environments, their 
activities, etc., and detect places to introduce recommended health actions? Finally, 
do the specifics of planning lead to the formation of consistent, i.e., habitual 
actions?  
Insights into how patients generate plans and develop consistent procedures or 
habits for managing health threats emerged from three recent sets of studies: 1) 
Longitudinal and experimental trials examining the effects of specific types or 
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components of communication on adherence; 2) Qualitative studies examining how 
individuals manage consistent performance; 3) Quantitative studies predicting how 
the factors identified in communication and qualitative studies effected consistent 
adherence, including the formation and value added of consistent, habitual action.  
 
Clarifying illness and treatment prototypes and initiating action-planning. 
Can clinicians encourage and improve effective self-management of chronic 
conditions by clarifying the nature and treatment of the presenting problem ‒ that is 
by clarifying illness and treatment prototypes and action-plans? This is not merely a 
practical or practice question; it is a challenge to experimental ingenuity, the 
methods and tools basic to all science. Although descriptive studies lack the 
statistical elegance of the randomized trial, they provide important clues respecting 
the content of clinical communications and patients' perceptions of a clinicians' 
style that do or do not encourage treatment adherence. Phillips, Leventhal, and 
Leventhal (2012) initiated a longitudinal study that provided a detailed examination 
of the effects of these factors by asking clinic patients to complete a questionnaire 
the day following a clinic visit. The questions assessed whether patients perceived 
their prior encounter as psychosocial (e.g., "My doctor understood my feelings 
about this problem"), or common-sense related (e.g., "The doctor told me how to 
monitor my problem to see if the treatment is working.") Patients were called and 
queried about the resolution of the problem a month later. Those patients checking 
high scores on the common-sense items were more adherent, and high scores on 
both adherence and the common-sense items (a direct path) were related to problem 
resolution. Although patients giving practitioners high praise on psychosocial skills 
were much more likely to be satisfied a month later, satisfaction was negatively 
related to improvement of the problem and psychosocial skills had no relationship 
to reported improvement in the condition that led to care seeking. The study 
illustrates the importance of providing more than a general instruction for 
treatment; practitioners who spell out the details of when and how to do a 
treatment, and what to expect during and after doing it, were effective 
communicators. How one defines a problem sets the stage for the choice and 
appropriate evaluation of treatment efficacy (Omer, Hwang, Esserman, Howe, & 
Ozanne, 2013).  
 
Clarifying Self-prototypes in clinical settings. How patients perceive and label 
themselves has observable effects on measures taken in clinical practice. For 
example, blood pressure recordings taken from the same patients in clinical settings 
and in their natural environments using ambulatory recorders, that are hypertensive 
in the clinical setting but normotensive in everyday life is defined as "white coat" 
hypertension (Spruill et al., 2007)."White coat" hypertension is not a chronic 
disease with potential long-term health morbidity, but patients may incorrectly Self-
label as hypertensive. Can prototypes of the Self be redefined by communications 
in clinical settings? 
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Howell and her colleagues conducted two, separate randomized clinical trial to 
reduce new mothers' postpartum depressive symptoms in an effort to reduce 
reporting of these symptoms postpartum (Howell et al., 2012). In the first trial, a 
total of 495 African-American and Hispanic patients, all new mothers, were 
randomized into treatment and control (enhanced usual care) conditions and 
interviewed at 3 weeks, and 3 and 6 months following delivery of the newborn. The 
primary question was whether an intervention clarifying expectations regarding the 
postpartum Self would reduce the experience of depressive symptoms. The 
intervention used simple graphical representation to describe the typical state of a 
new mother's body postpartum. For example, the pictorial representation of normal 
postpartum bleeding showed 10 small female figures, 8 red and 2 black, bypassing 
possible deficits in literacy and numeracy. Simple instructions to manage vaginal 
bleeding followed, along with clear expectations for outcomes; for example, by 
three months most mothers will stop having vaginal bleeding (8 black and 2 red 
figures). The intervention was successful in encouraging mothers to not use the 
prototype of the pre-pregnancy, normative self, to create the expectations for the 
postpartum self. By generating a biologically realistic representation of the 
postpartum self, patients expectations were more congruent with how they later felt 
and functioned, and the experience and reporting of postpartum depressive 
symptoms were reduced by roughly 40% at all three time points.  
In the second, separate trial which recruited Caucasian and Asian mothers, the 
investigators identified a critical error in planning trials. Recommendations for 
designing clinical trials typically fail to provide sufficient guidance for investigators 
to anticipate when, why and how an intervention may appear to fail. One important 
factor is having an ongoing assessment of the targeted outcome independent of the 
trial itself. In this trial, it meant having an ongoing record of reporting of depressive 
symptoms post-partum by mothers drawn from the population at large; this is 
necessary to detect shifts in the targeted outcome (depressive symptoms) in the 
population unrelated to known factors. As CSM is Bayesian, it calls for an ongoing 
measure estimate of population parameters; that is for a measure of the level of 
reporting of depressive symptoms, the target, or the percent of new mothers 
meeting or exceeding criteria for the target in the months and days before and 
during the trial itself. Had this measure been in place, it would have pre-empted this 
trial as the intervention failed to show any effect because few Caucasian and Asian 
mothers reported depressive symptoms above the targeted cut point; only 6% of the 
mothers in both intervention and control groups exceeded criterion for post-partum 
depression at base-line, i.e., prior to intervention. The trial failed as the target was 
too low to change! The 6% frequency was 20% lower than expected based on prior 
longitudinal studies conducted in the same hospital with similar participants 
(Howell et al., 2014). Although the pre-trial estimate of the level of reporting of 
depressive symptoms postpartum was based on prior data (Howell, Mora, & 
Leventhal, 2006), the parameter had drifted downward for reasons unknown.  
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It is important to repeat that the post-partum trial was based on the assumption 
that postpartum expectations are based on a normative, pre-pregnancy prototype of 
the Self. As prototypes are averages of ongoing life experiences, they are 
historically remote in time and likely to represent a more robust and functional Self 
than the immediate, pre-pregnant Self. The expectations generated by these 
prototypes are likely therefore, to set unrealistic targets for self-evaluations of 
recovery. This is true for many conditions, e.g., rehabilitation following sports 
injury, as well as post-partum depression. Though prototypes can and do change, it 
is likely that prototypes of illnesses and treatments are typically far more malleable 
than the prototype of the Self. This variability is a challenge clinically and 
experimentally. 
 
Action Planning and Habitual Performance 
 
Although telling patients how to do something, i.e. giving them an action plan, 
is clearly effective in providing strategies for action, it is not the same as assisting 
them with learning the skills to generate plans (including contingency plans if 
recommended plans do not work in the patient's life) on one's own. Although a 
number of patients know how to initiate action such as filling a prescription and 
taking a prescribed medication, many fail to generalize their initial performance 
into lifelong action. CSM researchers have thus begun to explicate maintenance 
mechanisms and processes (strategies) for longer-term adherence to treatments.  
 
Identifying conditions for habitual, long term adherence.  
1) Quantitative studies. There is evidence that habit strength, or behavioral 
automaticity, is important for long term adherence to simple treatment routines. 
Phillips, Leventhal, and Leventhal (2013) found that among patients with 
hypertension who had been taking their medication for years, reports of "habit 
strength" for action (i.e., having a habit or routine for taking one's medication) was 
the only significant predictor of long-term adherence ‒ compared to patients' 
treatment-related beliefs, barriers to adherence, and experiences that the treatment 
worked as expected. Bolman, Arwert, and Vollink (2011) similarly found that 
patients' habit strength for taking their prophylactic asthma medication predicted 
their adherence to that medication.  
The importance of consistent, habitual routines for long term adherence was 
uncovered in a recent study of 306 low income patients with asthma; 68% were 
African American and Hispanic, and all were over 60 years of age (Brooks et al., 
2015). The proportion of adherent patients in the sample was low; only 38.6% of 
the 306 participants reported strict adherence to daily medication for controlling 
asymptomatic, pulmonary inflammation. A small sub-set of participants, 16% of 
the sample, who combined medication use with existent habit patterns were 3.7 
times more likely to be highly adherent than patients who did not integrate taking 
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medication with existent, daily, routines. An example of such a routine was "… 
putting the inhaler in the bathroom and using it when I get up in the morning"; 67% 
of the patients using this strategy were highly adherent. Although initiating and 
converting adherence into systematic habit is more common among educated, 
financially better-off patients, any patient using these strategies is highly adherent 
regardless of their position on one or more external, moderating factors. The 
strategies work! The question is how did they plan?  
2) Qualitative studies. Focus groups of patients "expert" at self-management of 
their chronic conditions can provide insight not only to the strategies used for long 
term adherence, but to the strategies they used to discover and create habitual 
action. Unlike many qualitative studies that recruit patients struggling with 
adherence, Tannenbaum and colleagues followed the model set forth decades ago 
in studies of master chess players, by recruiting patients with diabetes who had 
achieved excellent control (Tanenbaum et al., 2015b). After reading each of a series 
of scenarios describing patients having problems adhering to diabetes medication 
and/or life styles, these "experts" were asked what they would recommend to the 
patient in trouble, and how they handled similar problems in their own lives. 
"Expert" patients described an array of strategies for generating routines that 
combined monitoring daily behavioral patterns and identifying those that provided 
"slots" for introducing and sustaining new behaviors essential for effective self-
management. For example, participants agreed that one needed to: 1. Recognize the 
threat, it can be life threatening, but then put it aside; 2. Focus on action and find 
start points; "You just cannot be a bystander in this disease."; "Do you want to live 
or do you want to die?"; "You change your food in the super market, not when you 
sit down to eat!"; 3. Adopt a gradual approach to change, "take one day at a time", 
and allow the body time to adjust to new exercise routine; 4. Experiment and 
monitor to detect safe and risky foods: "tested a lot at first. Trying to test out my 
food"; 5. Seek assistance when things are confusing, e.g., "called nurse to discuss 
readings"; and 6. Create habits – from novel to routine: "testing became second 
nature, like tying my shoes", a morning routine, "Wash my face, brush my teeth, 
then test my blood."  
The responses by these focus group participants suggest that consistent 
management is the outcome of planning and making use of strategies for 
organizing behavior. The strategies included identifying start points for initiating 
behavioral change (change food in the super-market, not when you sit down to eat), 
monitoring the performance and outcomes of specific actions to see if they met 
expectations, and making use of professional and lay resources. By monitoring, 
testing and continually updating the baseline/tonic levels of symptoms and 
behaviors, the system becomes coherent and automatic. The organizational process 
is initiated and sustained by the implicit awareness that one is managing a threat to 
health that is potentially disabling and lethal, and doing so for a lifetime.  
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The Future of Common Sense Modelling: Coherence and Automation  
 
The history of the Common-Sense Model (CSM) reflects a constant interplay 
between data and theoretical concepts. Representing the mechanisms and processes 
underlying self-management of anticipated and current health threats requires a 
substantial degree of complexity including the elements active at specific moment 
in time, e.g., representations of self, illness, treatments, procedures for planning and 
action plans, and the prototypes, and strategies for action and changing action. 
Additional complexity arises from the multi-level nature of the concepts ‒ the 
concrete, perceptual and behavioral referents for the abstract concepts or labels. 
Given the multi-level complexity of CSM, it is not surprising that the transition 
between initiating a health behavior and the maintenance of behavioral change 
requires more representations of illness and treatments and specific action plans 
(Phillips et al., 2013; Rothman, 2000). Investigators introduced measures of 
"habit", whether a specific self-regulatory action is habitual, to fill the gap and 
predict treatment adherence over the long term. A question that remains is, "How 
does the common-sense system represent the transition from initiating a behavior to 
making the behavior habitual?" A somewhat different way of posing the question 
is, "Do we need an additional measure of habit or can we represent the change in 
the existent CSM framework?" 
An answer to the above question suggested by the qualitative data, is that a 
successful transition requires embedding the start points for action and the goal for 
action in a comprehensive action plan, and conceptualizing the processes involved 
in the transition; experimenting, testing response outcomes and seeking 
professional and family assistance when needed. The outcome is a coherent self-
regulatory system in which the representations of illness, treatment and action plan 
share a common set of expectations regarding the procedures for controlling risk. In 
the language that might be used by a psychologically savvy participant in one of 
our focus groups: "My asthma is under control because I keep my inhaler in the 
bathroom and use it when I get up in the morning, sometimes after I brush my teeth 
though before I wash my face and sometimes after I wash. It's easy to do, and 
although I don't feel anything in particular when I use my inhaler, I can tell that I do 
not have as many attacks as I had before I started using it. My asthma is well 
controlled." In short, the system is fully integrated; the prototypes for treatment are 
those for the illness, and the action plan integrates these expectations into a daily, 
i.e., habitual performance. Although the system is largely automatic, the precise 
placement of the action, e.g., before or after washing one's face or just before 
leaving the bathroom, can vary just as the mice running mazes in Tolman's 
laboratory decades ago varied the pathway between start and goal, variability 
inconsistent with the concept of habit but not inconsistent with the formation of a 
representation or map of the context in which a varied array of behaviors could 
unfold (Moser & Moser, 2016).  
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Conceptual frameworks such as the Health Belief Model (from which the 
CSM was developed), the "theory" of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991) and other 
models focused on beliefs, are tested using validated scales to predict outcomes in 
regression models of cross-sectional or longitudinal data sets. Many studies using 
the CSM share this approach to design and analysis. Using scales to predict 
outcomes does not however, uncover the dynamic nature of transitions from doing 
nothing to starting and from starting to consistent action. How these transitions 
occur requires experimentation using theoretically based interventions that present 
study participants with examples and/or suggestions for particular strategies for 
environmental monitoring, selecting start points, varied behavioral patterns for 
reaching goals, and different time-frames and criteria for evaluating post 
performance experience. The randomized trials to reduce post-partum depression 
are but one of many illustrating specific ways of impacting the transitional 
processes leading to both initiation and adherence for the longer term. By activating 
an alternative view of the postpartum Self, a view that is understandable but not 
necessarily in a new mother's memory bank, the intervention altered new mother's 
views of their current status and reduced reporting and presumably the experience 
of postpartum depressive symptoms. Investigators committed to the use of reliable 
and validated scales for assessment and prediction, may be unwilling to take on the 
additional challenges of the experiment. The challenges are many as the 
interventions are complex and detecting necessary and sufficient components 
requires an innovative approach to design, as seen in the evolving work in the 
addictions field (Baker et al., 2014). Reluctance to shift to experimental approaches 
may also reflect a pattern common to the history of science; complex causal models 
may be less good at predicting outcomes than descriptive approaches; it's easier to 
predict sunrise and sunset from a table of past history than from a dynamic model 
of the solar system. Modelling the dynamics of change, i.e., identifying the 
interplay among the variables involved in the transition process using non-
traditional approaches to assessment, e.g., Go-Cameras, on site audio recording 
(Leventhal, McCarthy, Roman, & Leventhal, 2015), will advance and improve the 
science and benefit the health of populations.  
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Gestión de enfermedades crónicas en la vida cotidiana:  
Modelo de sentido común 
 
 
Resumen 
 
El modelo de sentido común de autorregulación (MSC) tiene una historia de más de 50 años 
como marco teórico que explica los procesos por los cuales los individuales forman 
representaciones cognitivas, afectivas y conductuales de la amenaza para la salud. Este artículo 
resume las mayores componentes de los modelos de sentido común de individuales, las 
suposiciones fundamentales de MSC como la teoría del cambio conductual dinámico y las 
mayores pruebas empíricas que han desarrollado estos aspectos de MSC desde los comienzos. 
Además, discutimos los cambios en curso de la misma teoría, tanto como su uso en la práctica 
médica para ayudar a los pacientes a optimizar la autogestión de amenazas de salud crónicas. La 
última sección se enfoca en las direcciones futuras de la teoría y su aplicación.  
 
Palabra claves: modelo de sentido común de autorregulación, representaciones de la enfermedad 
y el tratamiento, autogestión de enfermedades crónicas, teoría de la conducta de salud, adherencia 
al tratamiento 
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